SECTION 1. 

(a) Definitions — The following definitions shall apply to this measure:  

(1) “Election deepfake”, a deepfake that depicts a candidate, ballot question committee or political party with the intent to injure the reputation of the candidate or party or otherwise deceive a voter and that: (i) appears to a reasonable person to depict a real individual saying or doing something that individual did not say or do; or (ii) provides a reasonable person a fundamentally different understanding or impression of the appearance, action or speech than a reasonable person would have from an unaltered, original version of the image, audio recording or video recording.m 

(2) “Deepfake” means an image, audio recording, or video recording of an individual’s appearance, speech or conduct that has been created or intentionally manipulated with the use of generative adversarial network techniques or other digital technology in a manner to create a realistic but false image, audio or video. 

(3) “Digital Content Provenance” means the verifiable chronology of the original piece of digital content, such as an image, video, audio recording, or electronic document. 

(4) “Digital Content Forgery”  means the use of technologies, including artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques, to fabricate or manipulate audio, visual, or text content with the intent to mislead. 

(5) “Task Force” means the Massachusetts State Deepfake and Digital Provenance Task Force established in Section 2. 

SECTION 2. 

(a) There is hereby established a “Massachusetts State Deepfake and Digital Provenance Task Force” on or before July 1, 2024, to evaluate all of the following: 

(1) The proliferation of deepfakes impacting state and local government, Massachusetts-based businesses, and residents. 

(2) The risks, including privacy risks, associated with the deployment of digital content forgery technologies and deepfakes on Massachusetts state and local government, Massachusetts businesses, and Massachusetts residents. 

(3)  The impact of digital content forgery technologies and deepfakes on civic engagement, including the use of deepfakes to influence or deceive a voter. 

(4) The legal implications associated with the use of digital content forgery technologies and deepfakes. 

(5) The best practices for preventing digital content forgery and deepfake technology to benefit the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, local government, Massachusetts-based businesses, and Massachusetts residents. 

(b) The Task Force shall consist of 11 members: 2 of whom shall be the chairs of the joint committee on advanced information technology the internet and cybersecurity, who shall serve as co-chairs; 1 of whom appointed by the Speaker of the House of representatives; 1 of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Senate; 1 of whom shall be the secretary of the executive office of technology services and security, or a designee; 1 of whom shall be the attorney general or a designee; 1 of whom shall be the executive director of the ACLU of Massachusetts or a designee; and 4 members appointed by the governor; provided  

(1). Three of whom shall be from private industry, with at least two having a technical focus that includes digital content forgery, media manipulation, or               related subjects. 

(2). One of whom shall, in consultation with the Attorney General have a background in law. 

(c) The deepfake task force shall take input from a broad range of stakeholders with a diverse range of interests affected by state policies governing emerging technologies, privacy, business, the courts, the legal community, and state and local government. 

(d) The Deepfake and Digital Provenance Task Force shall develop a coordinated plan to- 

(1) Reduce the negative impacts of digital content forgeries and deepfakes, including by exploring how the adoption of a digital content provenance standard could assist with reducing the proliferation of digital content forgeries and deepfakes; 

(2) Investigate the feasibility of, and obstacles to, Massachusetts state departments adopting standards and technologies for determining digital content provenance; 

(3) Investigate the feasibility of conducting a public, consumer education campaign to Increase the ability of internet companies, journalists, watchdog organizations, other relevant entities, and members of the public to meaningfully scrutinize and identify digital content forgeries and relay trust and information about digital content provenance to content consumers; 

(4) Develop or identify mechanisms for content creators to do the following: 

(i) Cryptographically certify the authenticity of original media and non-deceptive manipulations; and 

(ii) Enable the public to validate the authenticity of original media and non-deceptive manipulations to establish content provenance. 

(5) Evaluate appropriate constitutional considerations. 

(e) On or before January 1, 2025, the “Deepfake and Digital Provenance Task Force” shall deliver a report to the Legislature regarding the potential uses and risks of deepfake technology in Massachusetts. The report shall be filed with the House and Senate clerks' office; and the Senate and House Committees on ways and means.  

The working group’s report shall include:  

(1) recommendations for modifications to the definition of digital content forgery and deepfakes; 

(2) recommendations for the development and implementation of policies and procedures regarding the use of deepfake and digital content forgery technology; 

(3) recommendations related to prohibitions and disclaimers on the use of election deepfakes and digital content forgery technology as it relates to deceptive or fraudulent depictions, in advance of an election, of a candidate, ballot question committee or political party; provided such recommendations shall include exemptions for news reporting on the deceptive or fraudulent depiction; 

(4) recommendations for regulatory or legislative action, if any, including but not limited to, recommendations for amendments to existing statutes and regulations that may require updates in light of the proliferation of digital content forgery technologies and deepfakes. 

(f) The members of the working group shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed for all necessary expenses actually incurred in the performance of their duties. 

(g) Upon the submission of the report, the Task Force shall sunset.