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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
CHIEF MARK K. LEAHY (RET.)
GENERAL COUNSEL
ERIC R. ATSTUPENAS, ESQ.

BUSINESS OFFICE
353 PROVIDENCE ROAD, SOUTH GRAFTON, MA 01560
TEL: (508) 839-5723 / FAX: (508) 839-3702

E-MAIL: OFFICE@MASSCHIEFS.ORG
WEBSITE: WWW.MASSCHIEFS.ORG

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In Unity There Is Strength

July 16, 2020

Via e-mail to: Testimony.HWMJudiciary@mahouse.gov

Re: Concerns to Senate 2820 as Amended

Dear Chairwoman Cronin and Chairman Michlewitz:

This morning members of the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association Executive Board and representation from the Massachusetts Major City Police Chiefs Association had the opportunity to give a thorough reading and comprehensive review of the recently amended Senate 2820, "*An Act to Reform Police Standards and Shift Resources to Build a more Equitable, Fair and Just Commonwealth that Values Black Lives and Communities of Color*" submitted to the House on 7/15.

As we have mentioned to both the Senate President and the Speaker of the House during various conference calls over the last couple of weeks, we, as dedicated and committed police leaders, will continue to embrace the challenges that lay ahead, instill strong values into our respective agencies at all ranks, hold ourselves completely accountable for all our actions, and work through these difficult and turbulent times to build a more cohesive future for our communities. With that, we would very much like to be part of this continuing conversation as it pertains to any contemplated police reform, fully realizing that time is of the essence as the legislative formal 2019-2020 session begins to wind down rather quickly.

In the interest of expediency we would like to submit a brief list of bulleted comments in the paragraphs that follow in the hopes of providing some potential insight from our law enforcement/policing perspective that is laid out in this comprehensive 89-page Senate bill. To the extent that we do not have an issue or concern with a specific provision of Senate 2820, or we view it as beyond the scope of local law enforcement we will not mention it in this communication.

The list that follows corresponds to the Section Numbers in Senate 2820 with the applicable line numbers:

- **SECTION 4 (line 230):** Under (iv), the provision states that there shall be training in the area of the "*history of slavery, lynching, racist institutions and racism in the United States.*" While we certainly welcome any and all training that enhances the professionalism and understanding of our officers, we are somewhat perplexed as to why law enforcement will now be statutorily mandated to have such a class to the exclusion of any other government entity?

One would believe that based on this particular mandate that the issue of what is inferred to as “racist institutions” is strictly limited to law enforcement agencies which aside from being incredibly inaccurate is also insulting to police officers here in the Commonwealth.

- **SECTION 6 (line 272)**: In terms of the establishment of a POST (Peace Officer Standards and Training) Program, the various police chief’s organizations here in our state wholeheartedly support the general concept. That said, the acronym of POSAC (Police Officer Standards Accreditation and Accreditation Committee) is causing significant confusion both in this bill and in the Governor’s Bill. POST has nothing to do with *Accreditation* per se but has everything to do with *Certification* – and by implication “De-certification”. In this state, there currently exists a *Massachusetts Police Accreditation Commission* (MPAC) for over 20 years which is made up of members of Law Enforcement (Chiefs, Ranking Officers), Municipal Government, and Colleges/Universities (Chiefs) in which currently 93 police agencies are accredited based on the attainment of national standards modeled from the *Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies* (CALEA). Utilizing the word “Accreditation” in the title is definitely misleading and should be eliminated. To the best of our knowledge 46 other states use the acronym POST which seems to work without any problems or a need to create a new description of the important program.
- **SECTION 6 (line 282)**: The Senate Bill states that POSAC shall be comprised of “14 members”, however as outlined there are actually 15 positions. The MCOPA is strongly advocating for two (2) seats on the POSAC to be appointed by the MCOPA Executive Committee.
- **SECTION 6 (line 321)** : It appears from the language of the POSAC provision that the committee shall have the power to conduct what is referred to as “*independent investigations and adjudications of complaints of officer misconduct*” without any qualifying language as to how that would be implemented in terms of what type of alleged misconduct (law violations, use of force, injury, rude complaints, etc.) and when and under what circumstances will adjudications be subject to review resulting in a proposed oversight system that could go down the slippery slope of becoming arbitrary and capricious at some point and subject to a high level of scrutiny and criticism.
- **SECTION 10(c) (line 570)**: Section 10 of “*An Act to Reform Police Standards and Shift Resources to Build a more Equitable, Fair and Just Commonwealth that Values Black Lives and Communities of Color*” (the Act) is problematic, not only for law enforcement in the Commonwealth, but all public employees. In particular, Section 10 calls for a re-write of the existing provisions in Chapter 12, section 11I, pertaining to violations of constitutional rights, commonly referred to as the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA). The MCRA is similar to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (setting for a federal cause of action for a deprivation of statutory or constitutional rights by one acting under color of law), except however, that the provisions of the MCRA as it exists today, does not require that the action be taken under color of state law, as section 1983 does. See G.L. c. 12, § 11H. Most notably, Section 10 of the Act would change that, and permit a person to file suit against an individual, acting under color of law, who *inter alia* deprives them of the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. By

doing so, the Senate is attempting to draw the parallel between the federal section 1983 claim and the state based MCRA claims.

The qualified immunity principles developed under section 1983 apply equally to claims under the MCRA. See Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 46-48, 537 N.E.2d 1230 (1989). "The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials who are performing discretionary functions, not ministerial in nature, from civil liability in § 1983 [and MCRA] actions if at the time of the performance of the discretionary act, the constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed was not 'clearly established.'" Laubinger v. Department of Rev., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 603, 672 N.E.2d 554 (1996), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commrs. of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 31-32, 513 N.E.2d 1277 (1987), *cert. denied sub nom. Forastiere v. Breault*, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1078, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988); Duarte v. Healy, supra at 47-48, 537 N.E.2d 1230.

In enacting the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, the Legislature intended to adopt the standard of immunity for public officials developed under section 1983, that is, public officials who exercised discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages. Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, Mass. App. 2001. Public officials are not liable under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for their discretionary acts unless they have violated a right under federal or state constitutional or statutory law that was "clearly established" at the time. Rodriguez v. Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 575 N.E.2d 1124 (1991); Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 537 N.E.2d 1230 (1989).

Section 1983 does not only implicate law enforcement personnel. The jurisprudence in this realm has also involved departments of social services, school boards and committees, fire personnel, and various other public employees. That being said, if the intent of the Senate is to bring the MCRA more in line with section 1983, anyone implicated by section 1983, will likewise be continued to be implicated by the provisions of the MCRA. Notably, the provisions of the MCRA are far broader, which should be even more cause for concern for those so implicated.

Section 10 of the Act further sets for a new standard for the so-called defense of "qualified immunity." Section 10(c) states that

"In an action under this section, qualified immunity shall not apply to claims for monetary damages except upon a finding that, at the time the conduct complained of occurred, no reasonable defendant could have had reason to believe that such conduct would violate the law"

This definition represents a departure from the federal standard for qualified immunity, although the exact extent to which it departs from the federal standard is up for debate, at least until the SJC provides clarification on it. The federal doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials of all types from liability under section 1983 so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Stated differently, in order to conclude that the right which the official allegedly violated is "clearly established," the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). It protects all but the plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). As a result, the standard sought to be created under Section 10 of the Act would provide public employees with substantially less protection than that afforded under the federal standard.

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).

Furthermore, although the Senate’s version of “qualified immunity” would only apply to state-based claims under the MCRA, what Section 10 proposes is fairly similar to that proposed by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in various decisions. In those instances where the 9th Circuit sought to lower the standard applicable to qualified immunity, the U.S. Supreme Court has squarely reversed the 9th Circuit, going so far as scolding it for its attempts to do so. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148 (2018); City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S.Ct. 500 (2019).

Although legal scholars and practitioners have a grasp as to the meaning of qualified immunity as it exists today, uncertainty will abound if this standard is re-written, upending nearly fifty years of jurisprudence. Uncertainty in the law can only guarantee an influx in litigation as plaintiffs seek to test the new waters as the new standard is expounded upon by the courts.

- **SECTION 39 (line 1025)**: The provision to inform both the appointing authority and the local legislative body of the acquisition of any equipment and/or property that serves to enhance public safety makes perfect sense. That said, to have a public hearing available for all in the general public to know exactly what equipment the police departments may or may not possess serves to put communities in jeopardy in that those with nefarious motives will be informed as to what equipment that the department has at its disposal. This is very dangerous.
- **SECTION 49 (line 1101-1115)**: This provision prevents school department personnel and school resource officers (who actually work for police departments), from sharing information with law enforcement officers – including their own agency – when there are ongoing specific unlawful incidents involving violence or otherwise. This quite frankly defies commonsense. School shootings have been on the rise since 2017. Did the Senate quickly forget about what occurred in Parkland, Florida on February 14, 2018? The learning environment in our schools must continue to be safe and secure as possible and information sharing is critical to ensuring that this takes place. Public Safety 101.
- **SECTION 50 (line 1116)**: There seems to be a slight nuance to the amended language to Section 37P of Chapter 71 replacing “*in consultation with*” to “*at the request of.*” Many police departments have had school resource officer programs in this state for 25 years or longer. The only reason why officers are assigned to the schools are because they have been “requested” to be there by the school superintendents - period. The reality is that many school districts even reimburse the police budgets for the salaries of these officers who serve as mentors for these young middle and high school students. If the Senate is being told that police chiefs are arbitrarily assigning officers to schools without first receiving a specific request from the school superintendents, they are being misled. The 2018 Criminal Justice Reform Act has very specific language that outlines the qualifications of an SRO, the joint performance evaluations that are to be conducted each year, the training that they shall have

and the language specific MOUs that must exist between the Schools and the Police Department. We are very confused as to why this provision needs to be included.

- **SECTION 52 (lines 1138-1251)**: There are several recommended changes to data collection and analysis as it pertains to motor stopped motor vehicles and pedestrians in this section. The Hands Free/Data Collection Law was signed into law only a few months ago before the onset of the pandemic. The new law contains a comprehensive system of data collection, benchmarking, review, analyses and potential consequences. While we continue to welcome data that is both accurate and reliable, the issue pertaining to the classification of an operator's race has still yet to be resolved. Before any data from calendar year 2020 has yet to be collected by the RMV and subsequently analyzed by a College/University selected by the Secretary of EOPSS, these provisions now look to complicate the matter even further before a determination has actually been made as to whether any problem of racial or gender profiling actually exists here in our state. We won't belabor the point, but this language appears to be what did not make its way into the Hands-Free Law which as you know was heavily debated for several months based strictly on the data collection component.

- **SECTION 55 (line 1272)**

To be clear, we do not teach, train, authorize, advocate or condone in any way that choke holds or any type of neck restraint that impedes an individual's ability to breathe be used during the course of an arrest or physical restraint situation. That said, we respect the discussion and concern pertaining to what is now a national issue based on the tragedy in Minneapolis. Under part (d) the language states that "[a] law enforcement officer shall not use a choke hold. [...]" What should also be included is a commonsensical, reasonable and rational provision that states, "unless the officer reasonably believes that his/her life is in immediate jeopardy of imminent death or serious bodily injury." There needs to be a deadly force exception to eliminate any possible confusion that this could cause for an officer who is in the midst of struggling for their life and needs to avail themselves of any and all means that may exist to survive and to control the subject. This is a reasonable and fairly straightforward recommendation.

- **[Recommended New Section] Amends GL Chapter 32 Section 91(g)**: In order to expand the hiring pool of trained, educated, qualified and experienced candidates with statewide institutional knowledge for the Executive Directors' positions for both the *Municipal Police Training Committee* as well as the newly created *POSAC* (or *POST*), the statute governing the payment of pensioners for performing certain services after retirement, shall be amended to allow members of Group 4 within the state retirement system to perform in these two (2) capacities, not to exceed a three (3) year appointment unless specifically authorized by the Governor.

We appreciate the opportunity to weigh in with our concerns and recommendations and hope that you would give due consideration to what we have outlined above. Should you have any follow up questions and/or concerns please do not hesitate to contact either of us in the days or hours that lay ahead. We respect that time is of the essence regarding this important legislation and stand ready to assist if and when called upon.

We will continue to be bound by our duty to public service, our commitment to the preservation of life, and our responsibility for ensuring our communities are safe. We will not waver. Thanks again for your diligent efforts in drafting this comprehensive legislation for the House and in continuing to add credibility and transparency to our valued partnership in serving our respective communities.

Respectfully Submitted:



Chief Brian A. Kyes
President, Major City Chiefs



Chief Jeff W. Farnsworth
President, Mass. Chiefs of Police